Clearest monograph EVER!!!
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Searle advocates Biological naturalism" as a valid theory, exposing the misdirectedness of the ever present mind-body problem as being entwined in the western philosophical tradition. Even though Cartesian Dualism has long been predominantly set aside, Searle argues, many of its concepts and vocabulary cloud current theorizing on the subject. Searle argues strongly for recognizing the Subjectivity of consciousness as a 1st-person ontology in itself, unexplainable by an objective epistemology, since its very nature is opposed to that method of investigation. By recognizing this Subjectivity as a property of the brain, and allowing that the mental and physical of the mind-body opposition need not be exclusive, Searle describes consciousness as a property of assemblies of neurons, in the sense that liquidity is a property of H2O moleculse. Unimaginable at the molecular level, but undeniable through a wider point point of view.
The clarity of Searles writing alone makes it worth the read, and his ideas address, if not solve, many of the most interesting topics in the philosophy of mind. Highly recommended to anyone interested in that field.
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"Biological Naturalism"
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This is the name John Searle gives is philosophy of mind. So what is it? The view, very broadly, is dedicated to the defense of the claim that mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological brain processes, and that these processes are themselves features of the brain. Sounds pretty straightforward to me, but one wonders, where has everyone else gone so hopelessly wrong over the decades? Searle accuses most in the field of the same general "neurotic compulsion" of attempting to force that which Searle views as the most fundamental and essential feature of the mind - consciousness - into various forms of materialism (the 'ol square peg into a round hole trick). Why is this? What fuels this compulsion? For Searle, the compulsion is fueled by a misplaced presumption - that a 20th (21st!) Century scientific world view can niether allow nor accomodate any "subjective ontology" - the fundamentally subjective nature of consciousness - into it. In other words, during each and every attempt to explain the mind, that which constitutes "the mental" is routinely left out of the equation. In the first few chapters, Searle outlines and argues against the various "materialisms" and attempts to "naturalize intentionality," in addition to explaining and arguing in support of the irreducibility of consciousness. In the latter chapters, Searle takes aim at cognitive science and its defenders (scientiffically-minded philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists alike), accusing pretty much everybody of refusing to recognize and accomodate the subjective component of reality - consciousness. Searle goes on to explain his own conception of consciousness as consisting of a "network" and a "background" (but NOT in the unconsious/conscious framework of folk psychology). In last couple chapters Searle takes aim at computational theories of the mind, arguing that a basic grasp of intrinsic vs extrinsic syntax and "the homunculus problem" are sufficient to dispatch them with ease. In the end, Searle supplies us with a simple set of guidelines to help us "get a grip" on ourselves with respect to the philosophy of mind proper: Stop saying things that are false; constantly remind oneself of things or facts known with certainty; never stop asking yourself what actual facts in the world are supposed to correspond with claims about the mental, and; "rediscover the social character of the mind." One has to admit, when all is said and done, a couple things about this book and John Searle. First of all, Searle may very well be the best writer - sylistically - I've ever read to-date. Second, Searle writes with such clarity and with such an attractive "attitude" that his views are terribly difficult to resist. Agree with him or not, this book is fantastically fun to read if you're into the philosophy of mind.
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The study of the mind is the study of consciousness.
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This book gives a good picture of the structure of the mind and of its irreducibility.
It explains clearly what's the stumbling block of all scientific and philosophical problems with consciousness: the fact that the mind is only a subjective first-person experience.But the most interesting part, for me, was his convincing attack against cognitivismn (the theory that the brain is a computer and the mind a computer program). Nevertheless, I found his book 'The Mystery of Consciousness' more interesting, more profound and more specific, because it laid bare the accuracies / errors of other author's who wrote about the same important items.
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state of analytic philosophy of mind at the end of century
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I sympathize with many of Searle's views about the inelliminability of the intentional character of consciousness, and the general misguidedness of philosophy of mind.. but I would ask: is this a big discovery? why read Searle rather than Husserl in the first place? Is his naturalism of any philosophical depth or interest? I would say no. I believe reading this book is a waste of time, as it was for me...
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A Polished Study
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In this book, Searle briefly reviews the history of the mind-body problem and presents his solution to it. The text is less filled with archaic or strictly philosophical phrases than most books in this field, giving it a comprehensibility that is too often lacking in the mind-body problem. Searle is a brilliant rhetorician, and every one of his arguments is worded in a convincing way. Also, the critique that he presents of the previous work on the mind-body problem is revealing, since he gives what he calls "common-sense objections" to each solution. Overall, an outstanding book.
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